Most multinational …rms today operate multilateral production networks. Most existing empirical analyses, however, have focused on …rms' choice between producing at home and investing overseas. This paper uses detailed French multinational subsidiary data to examine the e¤ect of existing production networks on multinationals' entry decisions. The paper …nds strong horizontal and vertical interdependence across multinationals' foreign production locations, but little interdependence between home and foreign production when third-country e¤ects are taken into account. This result constitutes a sharp contrast to the conventional emphasis, and highlights the importance of investigating foreign direct investment in the context of multinational production networks.
Introduction
Most multinational corporations (MNCs) today operate multilateral production networks.
French multinationals, for example, invested in, on average, 3.8 foreign countries in 2007, an increase of 0.9 country per …rm compared to 2005. Yet the vast empirical literature of multinational …rms has largely ignored the multilateral nature of MNC production, focusing instead on the relationship between home-country production and foreign investment.
Most studies in the literature assume that multinational …rms' decisions to invest in foreign countries are independent of their existing production networks in third countries, an assumption increasingly at odds as multinationals expand production around the world. This paper examines the e¤ect of third-country production networks on multinationals' entry decisions using a rich dataset that provides detailed location, ownership, and production information for French manufacturing …rms' foreign subsidiaries in 2005 and 2007. These data are used to identify the structure of individual …rms' production networks around the world and the change of the networks over time. They are also used to establish intra-…rm linkages, in particular, the input-output relationships of subsidiaries' production activities, thereby making it possible to distinguish the nature of interdependence among multinationals' foreign subsidiaries. 2.49 …nal-good production subsidiaries (producing …nal products). It is clear that multinationals' investment decisions can no longer be viewed as a choice between producing at home and investing abroad, but involve, instead, networks of vertically linked subsidiaries.
[ Figure 1 about here] Econometric evidence in this study suggests strong interdependence in multinationals' foreign production networks. Third-country subsidiaries exert a signi…cant e¤ect on multinationals' expansion decisions with respect to both …nal-good and intermediate production.
First, MNCs are more likely to locate …nal-good production in countries to which it would be relatively costly to import …nal goods from existing foreign subsidiaries. This result, referred to in the paper as horizontal interdependence, re ‡ects MNCs' market access motive.
Second, multinationals tend to produce …nal products in countries that o¤er better access to large markets. This …nding, labeled as the market potential e¤ect, captures the importance of host-country market potential. Finally, the paper …nds signi…cant interdependence between intermediate and …nal-good production subsidiaries. Speci…cally, multinationals tend to locate …nal-good production so as to minimize the cost of importing intermediate inputs from existing intermediate production subsidiaries. Similarly, MNCs are more likely to select countries with better access to existing …nal-good production subsidiaries as intermediate production locations. This type of interaction, referred to in the paper as vertical interdependence, is shown to increase in the extent of input-output linkages between subsidiaries.
The strong interdependence between MNCs' foreign production locations contrasts sharply with the little evidence of interdependence between multinationals' production at home and new investments abroad. The estimated relationship between foreign investment and home-country production becomes insigni…cant in the paper when third-country network factors are taken into account. This result is robust to the various speci…cations used to address omitted variable bias and potential endogeneity of network factors. In a departure from the existing literature, the result suggests that assuming away the interdependence of foreign production locations is likely to yield biased estimates for the relationship between home-economy performance and FDI activities, and calls for reconsideration of the conventional speci…cation to take into account the e¤ect of third-country networks.
Findings in this study also convey important messages to host-country policy makers.
First, given the vertical interdependence between intermediate and …nal-good production, trade policies like lower import tari¤s on intermediate inputs can a¤ect countries' attractiveness as …nal-good production locations. Second, FDI ‡ows to third countries can mediate a host country's ability to attract multinationals. This cross-country spillover can be either positive or negative depending on the linkages of FDI ‡ows. This paper is closely related to a growing theoretical literature led by Yeaple (2003a) , Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) , and Bergstrand and Egger (2008) that applies FDI modeling to a three-country framework. The existing literature on FDI, including the seminal work of Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984) , and in ‡uential empirical contributions by Brainard (1997) , Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) , Yeaple (2003b) , Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) , and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005) , stresses the importance of market access and comparative advantage in multinationals' incentives to invest abroad. 1 Yeaple (2003a) , Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) , and Bergstrand and Egger (2008) show that the combination of market-access and comparative-advantage motives can lead to export-platform FDI whereby multinational …rms adopt a host country as a platform from which to serve third nations. This prediction suggests that multinationals' investment decisions cannot be viewed as a binary choice between exporting from home and investing 1 See Blonigen (2005) for an excellent survey of this literature.
abroad, but rather engages other, third nations.
Most of the empirical literature has not taken into account the third-country e¤ect, much less the interdependence between multinationals' foreign production locations. The following few studies took the step of examining the determinants of export-platform FDI. Head and Mayer (2004) show that third-country market demand plays a signi…cant role in countries' ability to attract multinational …rms. They …nd that Japanese multinationals are more likely to locate in regions proximate to large markets. Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2007) consider a broader set of third-country characteristics and …nd most of the characteristics exert a signi…cant e¤ect on the level of U.S. outbound FDI. Chen (2009) examines how a host country's preferential trade agreements with third nations can a¤ect its receipt of FDI, and …nds that countries integrated with large markets tend to experience an increase in total and export-platform investment. Blonigen et al. (2007 Blonigen et al. ( , 2008 were among the …rst to investigate cross-country interdependence in FDI. Using sectoral FDI data, Blonigen et al. (2007) examine how investments in third countries a¤ect a country's receipt of U.S. FDI. They …nd the results to be sensitive to the sample of host countries: the third-country e¤ect can be either insigni…cant or of reverse signs. Evidence of negative interdependence across proximate host countries, a result consistent with export-platform FDI theory, is found mainly among European OECD members. Further, taking into account third-country FDI does not alter the estimated e¤ects of traditional FDI determinants. The importance of third-country e¤ects in inbound FDI is shown in Blonigen et al. (2008) . The authors …nd a strong parent market proximity e¤ect whereby parent markets' proximity to large third nations increases the volume of FDI. The e¤ect of third-country FDI in host countries is negative when the sample is restricted to European countries. This paper examines the cross-country interdependence in individual multinationals' production networks using subsidiary-level data. The dataset employed here o¤ers two distinct advantages relative to the aggregate data used previously in the literature. First, the dataset makes it possible to distinguish horizontal and vertical linkages for each pair of subsidiaries at a disaggregate industry level (NACE 4-digit), following the methodology introduced in Alfaro and Charlton (2009) . These linkages cannot be distinguished at the aggregate industry level considered in previous studies because, as Alfaro and Charlton (2009) note, a large percentage of vertical FDI is intra-industry. This might explain, to some extent, the ambiguity of the evidence reported in Blonigen et al. (2007 Blonigen et al. ( , 2008 , whose estimates likely re ‡ect a mix of horizontal and vertical interactions. Second, the subsidiarylevel dataset supports the examination of individual multinational …rms' entry decisions, thereby making it possible to compare the e¤ect of traditional FDI determinants with the e¤ect of third-country networks. Evidence in the present study shows that the ability to focus on intra-…rm interdependence results in sharply di¤erent …ndings from those reported in previous studies. Speci…cally, the estimated interdependence between FDI and homecountry production disappears when third-country network variables are included.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines attributes of French MNC production networks. A simple, three-country theoretical framework to motivate the empirical analysis is presented in Section 3, and the econometric methodology and data sources are described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The main econometric results are presented in Section 6, the sensitivity analyses in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Attributes of French MNC Production Networks
French multinational …rms' production networks exhibit a number of notable attributes. Comparing the distance of …nal-good production locations with that of vertically linked subsidiaries suggests that the geographic density of production networks varies signi…cantly with the input-output linkages between subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with input-output production relationships tend to be located closer to each other than subsidiaries that perform duplicate …nal-good production. The average distance between vertically linked subsidiaries is around 5,159 kilometers, signi…cantly less than the average distance between …nal-good production subsidiaries.
The above observations apply as well to tari¤s, which are obtained for each pair of subsidiary countries. For more than 30 percent of French MNC subsidiary pairs, the tari¤ rates between their subsidiary countries are zero. For more than 50 percent, the tari¤ rates are 7 percent or lower. At the …rm level, more than 15 percent of French MNCs do not need to pay tari¤s when exporting from one subsidiary country to another, and 50 percent face an average of 6 percent or lower tari¤s. This suggests that French MNCs' choices of foreign production locations are not always driven by the tari¤-jumping motive; a large percentage of French MNCs can trade freely within their production networks.
Tari¤ rates, like distance, tend to be lower between vertically linked subsidiaries than between …nal-good production locations. The average tari¤ rates for French MNCs to import intermediate inputs to …nal-good production subsidiaries are 1.5 percentage points lower than the 4.5-percent average tari¤ rates between …nal-good production subsidiaries.
Theoretical Motivation
As a prelude to the econometric analysis, a stylized theoretical framework is adopted in this section to motivate the empirical hypotheses.
General setup
Suppose the world consists of N countries N = f1; 2; :::; N g. In each country, a certain amount of the representative consumer's expenditure, denoted as E j (j 2 N ), is allocated to the industry of di¤erentiated products, within which the consumer has a utility function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Maximizing the CES utility function subject to the consumer's expenditure level yields the demand function for each representative variety: q ij = Y j p ij ; where q ij denotes the quantity of the di¤erentiated product produced by …rms in country i and sold to destination country j, Y j E j = P r p 1 rj denotes the demand level in country j with r representing the set of varieties, p ij denotes the product price, and 1=(1 ) > 1 the demand elasticity. Note that p ij = ij p i , where p i is country i's product market price and ij > 1 is the iceberg trade cost of exporting from country i to country j (with ii = 1).
Each …rm produces a di¤erent brand of the di¤erentiated product. Given the interest of the present study, it is assumed that country 1's …rms can produce …nal goods in any country and …rms in the other countries produce only at home and serve foreign markets via exports. Firms must pay a plant-level …xed cost F for each …nal-good production The goal of this model is to examine …rms' decisions to invest in …nal-good and intermediate production given an existing production network. Let F in i be an indicator variable that equals 1 if a …rm has …nal-good production in country i and similarly Int i be an in- respectively, by n F in (g) and n Int (g).
Maximizing pro…ts yields:
where c i is the marginal cost of producing the …nal good in country i. Given equation (1), the operating pro…t a …rm will earn by producing the intermediate input in country k and …nal good in country i and selling to destination country j is
where
It is clear that ij is an increasing function of country j's demand (Y j ) and a decreasing function of the …nal good marginal cost (c i ) and the trade cost to ship the …nal good from country i to country j ( ij ). Moreover, ij decreases in the marginal cost of producing the intermediate input (m k ) and the trade cost of shipping the input to the …nal-good production location ( ki ).
Suppose the …rm has chosen N F in (g) as the set of locations in which to produce the Venables (1996) , Venables (1996) , and Puga and Venables (1997) . The empirical analysis undertaken in this paper attempts to control for these factors using …rm …xed e¤ect, as …rm-level data that identify intermediate-input suppliers are largely missing. 4 Although roughly in alignment with the observation that French multinationals have, on average, fewer intermediate production subsidiaries than …nal-good production locations, this assumption is not crucial for purposes of the comparative analysis undertaken in the paper. …nal good and country k as the location in which to produce the intermediate input, that is, N Int (g) = fkg. The total pro…t function will then be given by:
In this equation, the …rst term represents the operating pro…t from domestic sales (in countries with …nal-good production), the second term represents the operating pro…t from export sales (in countries without …nal-good production), and the last two the …xed costs of …nal-good and intermediate production (which increase as …rms increase the number of production locations). Note that export pro…t depends on the choice of export-platform countries, that is, the …nal-good production locations in N F in (g) from which the …rm chooses to export to each market. Firms will strictly prefer location con…guration g to g if and
Final-good production location decision
Given the goal of examining …rms' investment decisions in a given production network, suppose the current production network consists of a …nal-good production subsidiary in country e i and an intermediate production subsidiary in country e k, that is, g 0 = fF in e i = 1; Int e k = 1g.
First, consider the decision to establish a new …nal-good production subsidiary in country i, denoted by F in i . If F in i = 1, the production network will change from g 0 to
. Firms will establish a …nal-good production subsidiary in i if and only if
Given equation (3), the above condition implies 5
which includes country i's domestic market size Y i and the (trade-cost weighted) aggregate size of third-country export markets, denoted by M e i , in which the …rm does not have …nal-good production. Letting e ki m e k =c i denote the extent of vertical linkage between intermediate input and …nal good, the above expression can be re-written as:
) + F:
As monotonic transformations and terms such as c e i , m e k , e k e i , M e e i and F do not a¤ect the ordering of host countries i, condition (7) can be simpli…ed (and taken natural logs) to obtain the following empirical speci…cation:
In this speci…cation, Pr [ F in i = 1jg 0 ] represents the probability of a …rm establishing a new …nal-good production location in country i given the …rm's existing production network 
Intermediate production location decision
Now consider the intermediate production location decision. Given network g 0 (where
; Int e k = 1), …rms will establish an intermediate production subsidiary in country i and move to network g 2 = fF in e i = 1; Int i = 1g if and only if
Given equation (3), this is equivalent to
Taking natural logs of the above condition yields the following empirical speci…cation:
In this expression, Pr [ Int i = 1jg 0 ] denotes the probability of a …rm establishing an intermediate production location in country i given its existing production network g 0 . The model predicts v < 0 (incentives to produce intermediate inputs are greater in countries with lower costs of exporting to …rms' existing …nal-good production locations, i.e., a lower i e i ), and h > 0 (…rms are more likely to invest in intermediate production when existing intermediate production subsidiaries have relatively high costs of exporting to …nal-good production locations). 6 The residual " captures remaining factors such as m e k .
Econometric Framework and Methodology
Based on the theoretical section, an econometric framework that examines …rms' investment decisions as a function of existing production networks is employed for the empirical analysis.
Econometric framework 4.1.1 Final-good production location decision
The decision of individual …rms to invest in …nal-good production is examined using a speci…cation built on equation (8):
6 Note that since ln e k e i is an attribute of …rms' existing production networks that does not vary with prospective host country i, it would be controlled for when …rm …xed e¤ect is included in the estimations. In addition to host-country characteristics, the right-hand side of equation (12) includes three terms that capture the structure of …rms' existing production networks in 2005. The …rst term, Horizontal F in , measures horizontal interdependence between …nal-good production locations. In this term, F in fF in 1 ; :::; F in e i ; :::; F in N g 0 is a vector that identi…es the existence of …nal-good production in each country in 2005 and I F in is a dummy variable that equals 1 if F in 6 = 0 and 0 otherwise. Two types of trade costs, including transport costs (proxied by distance) and tari¤s, are taken into consideration in constructing the network term. Speci…cally, W Dist is a weighting matrix composed of the distance between each pair of countries, i.e., fln Dist 1i , :::, ln Dist e ii , :::,ln Dist N i g for each country i; W T arif f is a weighting matrix consisting of the tari¤ rates of importing …nal goods, i.e., fln T arif f 1i , :::,ln T arif f e ii , :::, ln T arif f N i g for each i. To measure the average trade costs between …nal-good production locations, the vector F in is scaled by each …rm's total number of …nal-good production locations, that is, n F in . Section 3.2 predicts that h0 < 0, h1 > 0 and h2 > 0, that is, the probability of …rms investing in …nal-good production in a given country increases in that country's costs of importing …nal goods from …rms' existing …nal-good production locations.
The second network term in equation (12) 
Intermediate production location decision
Now consider the decision of each …rm to invest in intermediate production. The following speci…cation is adopted based on equation (11):
where In addition to host-country characteristics, the right-hand side of equation (14) 
Econometric methodology
Given the binary nature of the dependent variables, a probit model is used as a baseline speci…cation for estimating equations (12) and (13). Three econometric issues can arise in the empirical analysis including (i) omitted variables, (ii) prevalence of zeros in the values of dependent variables, and (iii) endogeneity of network variables. To address these issues, a number of alternative estimating strategies are employed, as discussed below.
Omitted variables First, it is possible that, in addition to …rm network variables, other …rm-level characteristics, such as productivity and business connections, also a¤ect …rms' entry decisions. A …rm-level …xed e¤ect can be included in the baseline speci…cation for equations (12) and (13) to control for the e¤ect of …rm attributes. 7 To avoid the potential incidental parameter problem associated with …xed-e¤ect probit models, alternative estimators like …xed-e¤ect linear probability and conditional logit models were also considered as a robustness check.
Prevalence of zeros A second issue concerns the prevalence of zeros in the values of dependent variables. This is determined by the nature of location entry data. Because, over a given period of time, a multinational …rm may make no new entry, choosing instead to operate with existing production networks, the dependent variables can consist of a large fraction of zeros relative to the number of observations.
To address this issue, a Heckman selection procedure is considered. In this procedure, (12) and (14).
Endogeneity of network variables Another issue that can arise in the analysis is the potential endogeneity of network variables. Even though a time lag is included between
7 Note that the adoption of …rm …xed e¤ects in probit models means that all multinationals that did not make any entry, that is, …rms for which F ini or Inti equals 0 for all i, will be dropped from the analysis. …rms' entry decisions and network characteristics, the network variables can still be endogenous when, for example, …rms are su¢ciently forward looking.
An instrumental variable (IV) approach is employed to address this issue. Consider …rst the …nal-good production location decision. In the …rst stage, each weighted network variable in equation (12), including W Dist F in, W T arif f F in, W Dist Int, W T arif f Int, ln M Dist , and ln M T arif f , is estimated using country i's characteristics X i and a vector of instrumental variables formed by corresponding weighting matrices and the matrix of host-country characteristics X. For example, the variable W Dist F in is estimated using X i and a vector of instrumental variables W Dist X. The …tted values of W Dist F in obtained from this stage are then taken into account in equation (12).
Similarly, for the intermediate production location decision, each weighted network variable in equation (14) is estimated in the …rst stage using X i and vectors of instrumental variables, i.e., W Dist F in and W T arif f F in. The …tted values of the network variables are then taken into account in equation (14) to estimate the e¤ects of existing production networks.
Data
The dataset employed in this paper, obtained from BvDEP AMADEUS, contains comprehensive …nancial and subsidiary information for public and private French …rms. AMADEUS combines data from specialist regional information providers around the world, with a particularly good coverage for countries like France. If its primary product is listed as one of the parent …rm's …nal products, the subsidiary 8 The …nal sample is smaller in some speci…cations because of the missing values of explanatory variables. 9 AMADEUS does not directly report time series information for subsidiary data. To obtain that information, it is necessary to acquire di¤erent editions of AMADEUS published in di¤erent years.
1 0 The coverage of sales, assets, and employment data is not as complete as the location information. In addition to …rm network characteristics, FDI determinants traditionally emphasized in the literature are also taken into account. First, several variables are used to capture the trade costs between home and host countries. For the …nal-good production, multinationals' incentives to invest in a foreign country are expected to increase in the trade costs of exporting …nal goods from home. This is the conventional market access motive of horizontal FDI shown in Markusen (1984) and following empirical studies by Carr et al. (2001) , Brainard (1997) , and Yeaple (2003b) , and predicts a positive parameter for transport costs, proxied by distance, between home and host countries and host-country tari¤s on the home country in the …nal-good industry. Multinationals' incentives to invest in …nal-good production in a given country are also expected to decrease in the trade costs of exporting …nal goods back home. This follows directly the theory of vertical FDI es-tablished by Helpman (1984) and predicts a negative parameter for the distance between home and host countries and home-country tari¤s on …rms' …nal goods produced overseas. 
Empirical Evidence
In this section, the econometric framework outlined in Section 4 is evaluated to establish the e¤ects of MNC production networks. Multinationals' entry decisions are estimated by …rst assuming away the interdependence in production networks. The results are then compared to the estimates that take into account production network e¤ects. This comparison helps to assess the role of existing production networks in MNCs' entry decisions and, further, how accounting for third-country production networks a¤ects the estimated e¤ects of conventional host-country characteristics. Table 1 reports estimates of equation (12) French MNCs exhibit a signi…cant market-access motive that is in alignment with previous …ndings. Firms are more likely to establish …nal-good production in countries with higher GDP. They also have greater incentives to enter countries that set higher tari¤s on …nal-product exports from France. The parameter of EU membership is negative, suggesting that …rms are more likely to choose FDI instead of exports in countries outside the EU.
Excluding network e¤ects
All of these results suggest a horizontal interdependence between MNCs' home and foreign production: MNCs are motivated to replace …nal-good exports from home with FDI when foreign markets are large and trade costs high. As found in previous studies, the e¤ect of distance is negative, consistent with the role of distance in raising …xed costs of investment.
[ Table 1 about here] Table 1 also implies a signi…cant comparative advantage motive for French MNCs. Multinationals looking to establish …nal-good production subsidiaries are attracted to countries with a lower unit labor cost. Investment costs also exert a signi…cant e¤ect on the entry decision. A higher cost of starting a business is associated with a lower probability of attracting multinational …rms. The sign of the corporate tax parameter is inconsistent with the expectation. This can be a result of the tax data used here, which report each host country's maximum corporate tax rate and do not necessarily capture the rates applied to multinational …rms. Because the latter information is not systematically available, to include it would reduce the sample size substantially. 17 The estimated e¤ects of host-country characteristics remain similar when …rm dummies are included in column (2) to control for potential omitted variables. The parameter of home-country tari¤s also becomes signi…cant, suggesting a negative relationship between French …nal-good tari¤s and multinationals' incentives to produce the …nal good abroad.
This result lends further support to the comparative advantage motive hypothesis: some French multinationals serve their home country from foreign production locations and are adversely a¤ected by home-country tari¤s. The Heckman selection procedure adopted to address the prevalence of zeros in the dependent variables yields similar results. Table 2 reports estimates of equation (14), excluding the network variables, for MNCs' intermediate production location decisions. As shown in the table, the estimated e¤ects of host-country characteristics are largely similar to those reported in Table 1 [ Table 2 about here]
6.2 Accounting for network e¤ects
Final-good production location decision
The e¤ects of existing production networks are considered next. Table 3 reports estimates of equation (12), for the …nal-good production location decisions, taking into account potential network e¤ects. The results provide strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdependence in multinationals' production networks. First, multinationals are signi…cantly more likely to invest in countries relatively distant from existing …nal-good production locations.
According to column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in third-country distance increases the probability of entry by 0.1 standard deviation. 18 This result applies as well to tari¤s. The incentive to enter a host country increases in the level of tari¤s on …nal-good imports from existing production locations. Market potential also plays a signi…cant role. Multinationals have a greater probability of producing …nal goods in countries with greater market potential. This points to the signi…cance of export-platform FDI, whereby multinationals use host countries as the platform from which to supply third countries, in particular, third countries in which the MNCs do not already have …nal-good production activities.
[ Table 3 about here]
The e¤ect of trade costs is reversed when there is a vertical production linkage between foreign production locations. (1), the probability of being selected as a …nal-good production location is 0.14 standard deviation higher for countries one-standard-deviation closer to multinationals' existing intermediate production locations. This result suggests that FDI activities in neighboring countries and vertically linked intermediate industries can trigger an increase in the ‡ow of FDI to a host country in the …nal good industry.
These …ndings remain robust to the adoption of …rm dummies and the Heckman procedure in columns (2) and (3), respectively. 19 Addressing the endogeneity of network variables also does not change the results qualitatively. As shown in column (4), most network variables continue to exert a signi…cant e¤ect on French MNCs' entry decisions.
The e¤ect of the conventional market access variables is a¤ected, however, by the consideration of production networks. As seen in Table 3 , the parameters of both host-country tari¤s on France and French tari¤s on host countries become statistically insigni…cant when the network variables are taken into account. This constitutes a sharp contrast with Table   1 , in which the evidence suggests signi…cant interdependence and, in particular, a substituting relationship between foreign and home-country …nal-good production. This change in the results suggests that it is not adequate to focus exclusively on the interdependence between home and host countries. Interdependence across foreign production locations increases as multinationals' production networks expand over time. The FDI decision is no longer a binary choice between investing in a foreign country and exporting from home; it has become signi…cantly more complex, involving third nations. Ignoring third-country network e¤ects is likely to give rise to biased estimates for the relationship between homecountry production and FDI activities and, more generally, the true causes and e¤ects of FDI.
In Table 4 , the extent of vertical production linkages is taken into account in constructing the intermediate production network variables, following the description in Section 4.1.1. The results are largely similar to those reported in Table 3 . The incentive to cluster vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with lower trade costs increases in the extent of vertical linkages. Intermediate production locations with a stronger input-output linkage to …rms' …nal-good production play a more important role in the choice of …nal-good production locations. Again, these results are not sensitive to the various estimation strategies employed in the analysis.
[ Table 4 about here]
Intermediate production location decision
The e¤ects of production networks on MNCs' intermediate production location decisions are examined in this sub-section. Table 5 reports estimates of equation (14) [ Table 5 about here]
Conclusion
This study is one of the …rst attempts to estimate interdependence in multinationals' global production networks. Using a detailed French multinational subsidiary dataset, the paper …nds, for the …rst time, strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interactions between MNCs' foreign production locations. These results complement existing contributions in which evidence of interdependence, obtained using aggregate FDI data, has been mixed.
Here, third-country subsidiaries are shown to exert a signi…cant e¤ect on French multinationals' entry decisions with respect to both …nal-good and intermediate production. It is crucial to analyze the causes and e¤ects of FDI in the context of global production networks. As shown in the paper, assuming away the interdependence of foreign production locations is likely to over-estimate the relationship between home-country production and foreign investments and, further, fail to account for spillovers among FDI ‡ows including, for example, the e¤ect of FDI in ‡ows to third countries on a host country's ability to attract multinational …rms.
This paper is a step towards examining interdependence in multinational production networks, but more research is needed in this area. For example, future work might investigate the heterogeneity of multinationals' production networks and role of …rm characteristics, such as productivity and production technologies, in explaining network attributes. This type of analysis will provide additional insights into the global organization of …rms. 
